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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Appellate Review-Prospective Overruling- Charitable
Immunities
In Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc.,1 the North Carolina
Supreme Court overruled its prior decisions2 and held that public
hospitals' may no longer rely on the common law tort immunity
doctrine. In so doing the court announced that the decision would
have no retroactive effect but would apply only to the case before it
and to causes of action arising after the filing date of the opinion.
The decision in part reflects an increasing awareness of the courts in
recognizing the hardships that can result from retroactivity.
It is the common law tradition that a judicial decision over-
ruling an established precedent has retroactive as well as prospective
effect. 4 However, when courts strictly adhered to this theory, prob-
lems arose in relation to parties who had based their conduct on
the prior decisions. As a result many courts adopted exceptions to
the general rule of retroactivity. The most common exceptions in-
volved criminal cases5 or cases where contract' or property rights'
'Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485
(1967).
'E.g., Williams v. Randolph Hosp. Inc., 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303
(1953); Smith v. Duke Univ., 219 N.C. 628, 14 S.E.2d 643 (1941); John-
son v. City Hosp. Co., 196 N.C. 610, 146 S.E. 573 (1929).
'The court otherwise professes to maintain charitable immunity as ap-
plied to "churches, orphanages, rescue missions, transient homes for the
indigent, and other similar institutions which remain charitable institutions
in fact."
' Mr. Justice Holmes in 1910 wrote "I know of no authority in this
court to say that in general state decisions shall make law only for the
future. Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thou-
sand years." Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Dis-
senting opinion). See generally, Currier, Time and Change In Judge-Made
Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as Currier].
'E.g., State v. O'Neil, 47 Iowa 513, 126 N.W. 454 (1910); State v.
Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940). But see, Warring v. Colpoys,
122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (writ of Habeas corpus denied even though
construction of statute under which accused was convicted had been altered
by a later decision). See generally, Freeman, The Protection Afforded
Against the Retroactive Operation of an Overruling Decision, 18 CoLum.
L. REv. 230 (1918); Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling De-
cisions, 35 ILL. L. Rav. 121 (1941); Note, 60 WARV. L. Rav. 437 (1947).
'E.g., Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863);
World Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Tapp, 279 Ky. 423, 130 S.W.2d 848(1939); Payne v. City of Covington, 276 Ky. 380, 123 S.W.2d 1045 (1938);
Gentzler v. Smith, 320 Mich. 394, 31 N.W.2d 668 (1948).
'E.g., Jones v. Woodstock Iron Co., 95 Ala. 551, 10 So. 635 (1892);
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had been acquired in reliance on court construction of statutes or
constitutions.
North Carolina was an early advocate of these exceptions. In
1904 the supreme court in State v. Bell' held that its earlier decision
interpreting a criminal statute should be changed, but that the defen-
dant could not be convicted for conduct which would not have been
criminal under the prior interpretation. The court stated:
While it is true that no man has a vested right in a decision of
the Court, it is equally well settled that where, in the construction
of a contract or in declaring the law respecting its validity, the
Court thereafter reverses its decision, contractual rights acquired
by virtue of the law as declared in the first opinion will not be
disturbed.9
Two years later, in a case involving the question of whether a lease
executed by a corporation was ultra vires or not, the court applied
the decision prospectively since the parties had relied on a prior
interpretation of a statute by the court.10 The court cited Bell with
approval stating that it was the only "fair and proper course to
pursue" and that the "opposite ruling would have met with strong
condemnation, as being contrary to the plainest principles of jus-
tice."'1 The following year the court continued this reasoning to
apply prospective overruling where a common law precedent was in-
volved." However, in 1908 the court attempted to restrict the broad
language of the prior decisions. In Mason v. Nelson Cotton Co.'3
it stated that the only exception to retroactive application should be
where construction of a constitution or statute was involved. It felt
it should not be extended to an "erroneous decision on general mer-
cantile law which is contrary to accepted doctrine and recognized
business methods."' 4
Hanks v. McDanell, 307 Ky. 243, 210 S.W.2d 784 (1948); Haskett v.
Maxey 134 Ind. 182, 33 N.E. 358 (1893). But cf., Carter Oil Co. v. Well,209 Ark. 653, 192 S.W.2d 215 (1946) (decision on which buyer of land
relied invalidated reservations in deeds; prospective overruling would have
been unfair to seller, who conveyed thinking mineral rights had been re-
served).
136 N.C. 674, 49 S.E. 163 (1904).9 d. at 677, 49 S.E. at 164.
"Hill v. Railroad, 143 N.C. 539, 55 S.E. 854 (1906).11Id. at 578, 55 S.E. at 868.
12 Hill v. Brown, 144 N.C. 117, 56 S.E. 693 (1907). However, the case
involved property rights.
13 148 N.C. 492, 62 S.E. 625 (1908). See generally, Spruill, The Effect
of an Overruling Decision, 18 N.C.L. REv. 199 (1939-40).11Id. at 511, 62 S.E. at 632. Other North Carolina cases that have
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Courts that have felt the need to apply a decision prospectively
have generally advanced 2 reasons: (1) a justifiable reliance by the
defendant on the prior law and (2) an undue hardship resulting
from such reliance.' 5 Although these same two reasons can be ad-
vanced in decisions involving common law interpretations as easily
as in statutory construction, few courts have prospectively overruled
common law decisions. 6 The doctrine as a whole received a great
impetus from Mr. Justice Cardozo speaking for the United States
Supreme Court in Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co. 7 Al-
though the case involved the interpretation of a statute and the
prospective overruling of a prior interpretation, Cardozo made it
clear that it did not matter whether the decision involved common
law or statutory construction.' 8
However, most cases after Sunburst that applied a decision pro-
spectively still involved contract, property or criminal law.19 In the
field of tort law the rule continued to be one of retroactive applica-
tion of decisions."0 Recently common law doctrines of sovereign and
charitable immunity have been vigorously attacked resulting in
numerous decisions discarding the previous announced rule.21 The
Illinois Supreme Court in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
applied a decision prospectively have also involved contract, property or
criminal law. e.g., Wilkinson v. Wallace, 192 N.C. 156, 134 S.E. 401 (1926) ;
Fowle v. Ham, 176 N.C. 12, 96 S.E. 639 (1918). However, after this
flurry of cases at the beginning of the century, the court has failed to apply
the doctrine in any recent cases. See generally, Note, 11 N.C.L. RItv. 323(1932-33); Note, 5 N.C.L. REv. 170 (1927).
" See cases cited notes 4-6 supra.
"E.g., Jones v. Woodstock Iron Co., 95 Ala. 551, 10 So. 635 (1892);
World Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Tapp, 279 Ky. 423, 130 S.W.2d 1045(1938). Writers have criticized the courts for making this distinction. See
e.g., Freeman The Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive Opera-
tion of an Overruling Decision, 18 CoLum. L. REv. 230 (1918).
1,287 U.S. 358 (1932).
1' Cardozo also made it clear that prospective operation did not conflict
with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. He stated that
a state could decide for itself between prospective or retroactive operation.
287 U.S. at 364.
"0 For an extensive list of citations see Note, 60 HARv. L. Rlv. 437, 441-
47 (1947).
"' Tort cases that have applied a decision prospectively have involved
changes in rules of procedure. E.g., Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339,
251 S.W.2d 42 (1952) (instructions on damages in personal injury suit).
See generally, Currier at 244 for the reasoning behind the absence of pro-
spectiveness in tort cases.
2' The court in Rabon lists all the jurisdictions. See 269 N.C. at 17-19,
152 S.E.2d at 496-98.
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Dist. No. 302,2 therefore, felt this situation clearly called for an
application of prospective overruling. The reliance factor was clear.
School districts relying on the immunity had for years failed to pur-
chase any liability insurance and if the decision were applied retro-
actively, the result would have been unjust. In Rabon the North
Carolina Supreme Court specifically recognized this injustice and
prospectively overruled the immunity of charitable hospitals.-
However, the court in Rabon took another step that seems to
stand on more tenuous ground. Since Sunburst was wholly pro-
spective, many critics claimed this left the plaintiff unrewarded and
was little incentive for others to commence actions to change exist-
ing, outmoded laws. 4 As a result, the court in Molitor announced
that the new rule of liability would extend not only to all cases aris-
ing after the lling date of the opinion but also allowed the plaintiff
in that case to recover. The North Carolina Supreme Court fol-
lowed this position.
This practice produces results which are not easily justified.
First of all reliance is the main argument the courts have used to
justify applying decisions prospectively and clearly the defendant be-
fore the court has relied on the rule as much as anybody. Moreover,
there seems little justification for rewarding this plaintiff because
he is before the court and failing to allow numerous other injured
parties to recover-especially where their suits have been commenced
before this one.2 5
2 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
"'Although reliance is generally advanced for applying a decision pro-
spectively, Professor Currier suggests that in the immunity field the courts
might not have reached this result without a concern for maintaining insti-
tutional stability. Currier at 245. Other jurisdictions have refused to apply
their decision discarding immunity prospectively, specifically rejectng the
reliance theory. See e.g., Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738
(Ky. 1964) (Soverign immunity); Dauton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church,
27 N.J. 22, 141 A.2d 273 (1958) (charitable immunity).
"2 For an extensive listing of law review articles on Sunburst see Note,
13 MONT. L. REv. 74, 78 n.15 (1952). The other criticism generally ad-
vanced against Sunburst is that to announce a new rule to be followed in
the future and not apply it to the case before the court would amount to
mere dictum. See generally, Note, 14 VAND. L. Ruv. 406 (1960).
" See generally Keeton, Creative Continuity In the Law of Torts, 75
HAmv. L. REv. 463 (1962). This led to the ironical result in Molitor that
the other seventeen children injured in the same accident were denied re-
covery in the lower court. Although this was reversed on appeal because
of the procedure followed in the original case indicating that the plaintiff
was representing the other claimants, the expense of an additional appeal
was necessary.
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Of the other three jurisdictions which have applied the new rule
to the plaintiff in the suit before them, 26 the Michigan Supreme
Court has encountered the most difficulty. When the court in Parker
v. Port Huron Hosp. overturned the charitable immunity doctrine,
there was a vacancy on the court reducing the normal membership
from eight to seven. The court split four to three in overruling the
doctrine. The following year in Browning v. Paddock,2" where the
plaintiff's cause of action arose prior to Parker and was thus theo-
retically barred, the court was unanimous in denying liability but the
same split occurred as to the reason. Four justices applied the pro-
spective rule of Parker in barring plaintiff, while three applied the
common law immunity rule. Justice Black, the new member of the
court, stated that if he had been on the court during Parker he would
have voted to apply the decision prospectively. However, he felt that
it should have been wholly prospective and should not have allowed
the plaintiff there to recover. On the same day as Browning the
court discarded the municipal immunity doctrine in Williams v. City
of Detroit.29 The lower court had denied recovery based on the
common law immunity. The supreme court affirmed this but again
split 4-3-1. Justice Black voted with the four to abolish soverign
immunity in the future but felt it should not be applied to the instant
case. His vote was therefore counted with the "three" resulting
in an affirmance denying liability. The result was, in effect, a wholly
prospective decision announcing abrogation of immunity for future
litigants but the peculiar split left the status of soverign immunity
unclear. In 1965 the Michigan Supreme Court apparently reached a
compromise when it abrogated soverign immunity as applied to a
state subdivision. The court announced that its decision would apply
to "pending and future cases" as well as to that case itself. 0
Thus, for courts that are reluctant to overrule outmoded de-
cisions because of the reliance of the parties on precedent, prospec-
tive overruling is a desirable addition to the range of choices. How-
"8 Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960);
Myers v. Drozda, 180 Neb. 183, 141 N.W.2d 852 (1966); Kojis v. Doctors
Hosp., 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 292 (1961).
" 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960).
', 364 Mich. 293, 111 N.W.2d 45 (1961).
"364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
"Myers v. Genesee County Auditor, 375 Mich. 1, 133 N.W.2d 190(1965). Arizona also adopted this position in Stone v. Arizona Highway
Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963).
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ever, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Rabon would have done
well to have considered the warning enunciated by Justice Black in
Williams v. City of Detroit:
If we are to overrule, let us do it outright either way, manfully
according to the tried rules of judicial process. That is the only
way to avoid what Browning and Molitor already have proven;
that an appellate court, having determined to reward one litigant
only of a distinct and inseparable class of litigants, naively asks
for and gets into no end of trouble.8 '
To reduce the uneven treatment resulting from partially prospective
overruling, the preferable solution would have been for the court to
have chosen between wholly prospective and retroactive application. 2
JAmES A. MANNINO
Bankruptcy: Trustee's Title to Bankrupt's Property
In Bank of Marin v. England' a debtor drew five checks upon
his commercial account with the defendant bank. The debtor then
filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy before the checks were pre-
sented for payment. Six days after the petition was filed, the bank,
having no notice of bankruptcy proceedings, paid the checks when
presented by the payee. The bankruptcy trustee sought to require
the bank to pay him the amount paid by the bank upon the five
checks. The referee found the bank and the payee jointly liable to
the bankrupt's estate for the amount of the checks and the district
court enforced this finding. The decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit2 holding that a bank that honors
checks in good faith without notice of voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy is liable to the bankruptcy trustee for the amount paid.2
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance
of the question presented, and reversed.
In 1938 Congress passed the Chandler Act amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act. These amendments were made necessary by the
"Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 278-79, 111 N.W.2d 1, 14(1961) (Concurring opinion).
" See generally Keeton, Creative Continuity In the Law of Torts, 75
HARV. L. Rav. 463 (1962).
'385 U.S. 99 (1966).
2 352 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1965).
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